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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994, the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorized the 
Bankruptcy Court to award fees and expenses from the 
debtor's estate to the debtor's attorneys. The Reform Act 
omitted debtors' attorneys from the list of officers eligible to 
receive such an award. See 11 U.S.C. S 330 (1994). We are 
now confronted with the inevitable question of whether a 
debtor's attorney remains eligible for compensation from 
the estate. We conclude that debtors' attorneys are still 
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eligible to receive compensation for fees and expenses 
reasonably likely to benefit the estate. Under the specific 
facts of this case, however, we conclude that the debtor's 
attorneys' services were not reasonably likely to benefit the 
estate. We will, therefore, affirm the denial of debtor's 
attorneys' fees in toto for services rendered during the 
Chapter 11 proceedings. 
 
Jurisdiction was proper in the District Court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. SS 158(a)(1) and 1331. Jurisdiction is proper in 
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 158(d) and 1291. 
"Because the District Court sat as an appellate court, 
reviewing an order of the Bankruptcy Court, our review of 
the District Court's determinations is plenary." In re 
Rashid, 210 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 2000). "In reviewing the 
bankruptcy court's determinations, we exercise the same 
standard of review as the district court." Fellheimer, Eichen 
& Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 
1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, we review the 
Bankruptcy Court's legal determinations de novo, its 
factual findings for clear error, and its exercise of discretion 
for abuse thereof. In re Engel, 124 F.3d 567, 571 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
I. FACTS 
 
The Lipari family owned and managed two successful 
New Jersey businesses. Top Grade Sausage, Inc., 
manufactured and distributed sausage. Forist Distributors, 
Inc., delivered lamb and veal to retailers. When the family 
was confronted with considerable debt from the criminal 
defense of the family patriarch, Joseph Lipari, Top Grade 
and Forist (collectively "Debtors") filed separate voluntary 
petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Because of 
the commonality of parties and issues, the Bankruptcy 
Court administered the two cases together. 
 
Walder Sondak & Brogan, P.A., the law firm that 
represented the father during his criminal trial and a 
judgment creditor of both Debtors, filed a motion to appoint 
a Chapter 11 trustee for both Debtors. The Bankruptcy 
Court granted the motion, appointed a single Trustee for 
the Debtors, and approved the Trustee's choice of counsel. 
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After appointment of the Trustee and Trustee's counsel, the 
Debtors filed an Application for retention of Hellring, 
Lindeman, Goldstein & Siegal as Debtors' counsel. 
According to the Application, Hellring Lindeman was to (1) 
advise the Debtors of their duties, (2) negotiate and 
effectuate an arrangement with the creditors, (3) prepare 
any necessary applications or other legal papers, (4) appear 
before the Bankruptcy Court and protect the interests of 
the Debtors, and (5) perform all other legal services for the 
Debtors. The Bankruptcy Court granted the Debtors' 
motion on November 18, 1996. 
 
The attempted reorganization of the two companies was 
unsuccessful and marred by acrimony and rancor. The 
Trustee assumed control of the companies' operations. 
Hellring Lindeman was required to address the many 
conflicts that arose between the Lipari family and the 
Trustee in the course of the daily operation of the 
businesses. Hellring Lindeman also filed a reorganization 
plan and disclosure statement. 
 
As efforts to reach a reorganization plan proved to be 
unsuccessful, Walder Sondak filed a motion to convert 
Forist's Chapter 11 reorganization into a Chapter 7 
liquidation. On June 30, 1997, the Bankruptcy Court 
permitted the conversion. Top Grade continued to operate 
and the parties continued to try to negotiate a 
reorganization plan. When these efforts failed, the Trustee 
closed Top Grade. On August 21, 1997, the Bankruptcy 
Court converted Top Grade's Chapter 11 reorganization into 
a Chapter 7 liquidation. 
 
Following conversion of the Debtors' petitions, the 
Bankruptcy Court fixed a deadline for the filing of Chapter 
11 administrative claims. Hellring Lindeman filed Chapter 
11 fee applications aggregating $ 80,959.75 in fees and 
$1,403.98 in expenses. The Trustee, the United States 
Trustee, and Walder Sondak filed objections to Hellring 
Lindeman's fee application. Each set of objections was 
limited to the compensability of specific entries. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court conducted a single hearing to 
consider all the fee applications. During its colloquy with 
counsel, the Bankruptcy Court raised sua sponte  the 
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question of whether Hellring Lindeman's Application should 
be denied in toto. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court was 
concerned that Hellring Lindeman's representation of 
debtors-out-of-possession was of no value to the estate. 
During the hearing, Hellring Lindeman did not ask the 
Court for additional time to address its concerns, nor did it 
request a second hearing in the thirty-seven days between 
the hearing and issuance of an opinion. 
 
On December 3, 1998, the Bankruptcy Court issued its 
ruling from the bench. A representative from Hellring 
Lindeman was not present. The Bankruptcy Court 
disallowed payment of any fees or expenses by the estate to 
Hellring Lindeman for services rendered to the debtors 
during the attempted reorganizations. The Bankruptcy 
Court did permit some compensation for services rendered 
after the debtors' petitions were converted to Chapter 7. 
The Bankruptcy Court reasoned that for a debtor's 
attorneys to receive compensation from the estate, they 
must show that their services provided a benefit for the 
estate. The Bankruptcy Court found that Hellring 
Lindeman's services were either duplicative of services 
rendered by the Trustee or rendered solely for the benefit of 
the debtor and not of the estate. 
 
Hellring Lindeman timely appealed to the District Court. 
Hellring Lindeman claimed that the Bankruptcy Court's 
decision to deny compensation in its entirely did not 
comport with due process because Hellring Lindeman was 
not notified of the Bankruptcy Court's position prior to the 
hearing. Furthermore, Hellring Lindeman alleged that the 
Bankruptcy Court erred by requiring Hellring Lindeman to 
show an "actual benefit" to the estate rather than showing 
that, at the time rendered, the services were reasonably 
likely to benefit the estate. 
 
The District Court affirmed the decision of the 
Bankruptcy Court. In doing so, it raised for thefirst time 
the issue of whether, pursuant to the 1994 amendment to 
S 330(a)(1), a bankruptcy court may award fees to a debtor's 
attorney. The District Court held that, despite the omission 
of "debtor's attorney" from the amended language of the 
statute, services by a debtor's attorney which benefit the 
estate are compensable and that the omission of"debtor's 
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attorney" from the language of S 330(a)(1) was inadvertent. 
Hellring Lindeman now appeals to this Court and raises the 
same issues presented to the District Court. 
 
II. EFFECT OF THE REFORM ACT AMENDMENT TO 
S 330 
 
Before we consider the constitutional adequacy of the 
Bankruptcy Court's proceedings or the underlying merits of 
Hellring Lindeman's request for fees and expenses, we must 
decide if the attorney for a Chapter 11 debtor is statutorily 
entitled to receive compensation from the estate. Prior to 
1994, the answer was clear. Debtors' attorneys were among 
four classes of officers to whom the Bankruptcy Court was 
specifically authorized to award such compensation.1  See 
11 U.S.C. 330. Congress, however, made sweeping changes 
to the Bankruptcy Code with the passage of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994 (Reform Act), Pub.L. 103-394. See First 
Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co. , 198 
F.3d 394, 400 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (listing some of the 
changes codified in the Reform Act). Among the sections 
amended by Congress was S 330, the statutory source for 
compensating officers of the debtor's estate. Section 330 
now reads in relevant part: 
 
       (a)(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code provided that: 
 
       After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States 
       trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of 
       this title, the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a 
       professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this 
       title, or to the debtor's attorney-- 
 
       (1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered 
       by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the 
       case may be, and by any paraprofessional persons employed by 
       such trustee, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, 
       based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, 
the 
       time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services 
       other than in a case under this title; and (2) reimbursement for 
       actual, necessary expenses. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 330(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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       United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to 
       sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a 
       trustee, an examiner, a professional person employed 
       under section 327 or 1103-- 
 
       (A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary 
       services rendered by the trustee, examiner, 
       professional person, or attorney and by any 
       paraprofessional person employed by any such 
       person; and 
 
       (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 330. The amended section is remarkable for two 
reasons. Missing from the list of officers eligible to receive 
compensation is a debtor's attorney. Also, the penultimate 
and ultimate class of officers are separated only by a 
comma and not by the disjunctive "or." This omission 
renders the section grammatically unsound. It has also led 
to a split among courts considering whether debtors' 
attorneys are still eligible to receive compensation from the 
proceeds of the estate. 
 
Some courts, led by the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, have concluded that the 
plain meaning of S 330(a) precludes the award of 
compensation to debtors' attorneys. See In re Inglesby, 
Falligant, Horne, Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In re 
American Steel Product, Inc.), 197 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 
1999); Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re 
Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc.), 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998). 
Other courts, led by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, have looked beyond the omission and determined 
that Congress's deletion of "debtor's attorney" from the 
statute was inadvertent and thus courts should read 
"debtor's attorney" back into the statute. See United States 
Trustee v. Garvey, Schubert & Barer (In re Century Cleaning 
Service, Inc.), 195 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999). See also In re 
Ames Department Stores, Inc., 76 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(stating in dictum that it was "inclined to agree" that 
debtor's attorneys were still eligible after passage of the 
Reform Act to receive compensation for their services and 
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expenses). This question of statutory construction is a 
matter of first impression in this Court.2 
 
We begin by looking at the language of the statute. See 
Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport , 495 U.S. 
552, 557-58 (1990). When the language is unambiguous 
and "the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there 
generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain 
language of the statute." United States v. Ron-Pair 
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989). After a close 
analysis of the disputed section and its location in the 
Bankruptcy Code, we find that, if the current version of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We would not need to answer this complicated question here if 
Hellring Lindeman qualified as a "professional person[ ] employed under 
section 327 or 1103" pursuant to S 330. Unfortunately, Hellring 
Lindeman does not qualify for compensation as a professional person. 
Section 1103 is concerned with professional persons hired in support of 
the creditors' and equity security holders' committees. Section 327 
concerns the employment of professional persons by the trustee. This 
section reads in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with 
the 
       court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, 
       appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not 
       hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are 
       disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in 
carrying 
       out the trustee's duties under this title. 
 
       (b) If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the 
debtor 
       under section 721, 1202, or 1108 of this title, and if the debtor 
has 
       regularly employed attorneys, accountants, or other professional 
       persons on salary, the trustee may retain or replace such 
       professional persons if necessary in the operation of such 
business. 
       . . . 
 
       (e) The trustee, with the court's approval, may employ, for a 
       specified special purpose, other than to represent the trustee in 
       conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor, 
if 
       in the best interest of the estate, and if such attorney does not 
       represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the 
estate 
       with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be 
       employed. 
 
Since it was the debtors, not the Trustee or a creditors' committee, 
that retained Hellring Lindeman, Hellring Lindeman cannot show that it 
was hired pursuant either to S 327 or to S 1103. 
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statute is read to omit "debtor's attorney," it is ambiguous 
and inconsistent with other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
 
The most striking effect caused by the omission is on the 
internal consistency of S 330 itself. The section is comprised 
of just one long sentence. The sentence begins by 
delineating those officers to whom the District Court "may 
award" payments. As emphasized above, "debtor's attorney" 
is no longer included in this first list. But when the 
sentence continues at subsection (a)(1)(A), the list of 
potential fee recipients is unchanged from the previous 
version of the subsection. The Bankruptcy Court is 
authorized to award payment for services that are rendered 
by "the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney 
and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such 
person." 11 U.S.C. S 330(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). As S 330 
now reads then, the second half of the sentence seems to 
partially permit what the first half prohibits. 
 
One possible explanation is that debtors' attorneys are 
not the only attorneys whose services could benefit the 
estate. Other officers of the estate must routinely hire 
attorneys to help with the administration of the estate. 
Those attorneys' services should be compensated. While 
this is true, however, the present structure ofS 330 does 
not support this conclusion. Prior to amendment, it was 
undisputed that the repetition of officers inS 330(a)(1)(A) 
was meant to parallel the officers previously listed in 
S 330(a)(1). See In re Miller , 211 B.R. 399, 402 
(Bankr.D.Kan. 1997). 
 
Moreover, the current version uses the definite article 
"the" to modify the officers listed in S 330(a)(1)(A) rather 
than the indefinite articles "a," "an," or "any." Webster's 
dictionary defines "the" as "a function word to indicate that 
a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been 
previously specified by context or by circumstance." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1222 (1989). 
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (6th ed. 1990) 
("In construing statute, definite article `the' particularizes 
the subject which it precedes and is word of limitation as 
opposed to indefinite or generalizing force `a' or `an'."). The 
use of "the" in S 330(a)(1)(A) then refers to the universe of 
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officers listed in S 330(a)(1), thereby leaving the word 
"attorney" in S 330(a)(1)(A) without prior reference. 
See Miller, 211 B.R. at 402. See also In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 
1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourts are obliged to give 
effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."). 
 
If, on the other hand, Congress had wished to authorize 
payment for all attorney services performed for officers of 
the estate, Congress should have modified "attorney" with 
the indefinite article "any," as it did"paraprofessionals." 
This modification would not, however, have been necessary 
for payment of attorneys hired by the trustee because this 
category of attorneys can be compensated as "professional 
persons employed under section 327 or 1103 . . . ."3 11 
U.S.C. S 330. 
 
Some courts have sought to explain the retention of 
"attorney" in S 330(a)(1)(A) by reference to S 330(a)(4)(B), 
which was added in the Reform Act. Section 330(a)(4)(B) 
provides that 
 
       [i]n a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the 
       debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable 
       compensation to the debtor's attorney for representing 
       the interests of the debtor in connection with the 
       bankruptcy case based on the consideration of the 
       benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and 
       other factors set forth in this section. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 330(a)(4)(B). See e.g., Century Cleaning, 195 
F.3d at 1064 (Thomas, J. dissenting); In re Fassinger, 191 
B.R. 864, 865 (Bkrtcy.D.Or. 1996). These courts have 
concluded that "attorney" in S 330(a)(1)(A) must reference a 
debtor's attorney permitted compensation by S 330(a)(4)(B). 
Moreover, courts have held that S 330(a)(4)(B) provided 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The dissent in Century Cleaning, 195 F.3d at 1063, supported the 
restrictive interpretation of "attorney" inS 330(a)(1)(A) by concluding 
that 
"it is entirely consistent . . . that Congress intended to eliminate 
compensation as a matter of course, but wished to retain the avenue for 
a Chapter 7 debtor's attorney to receive compensation on appointment 
by the trustee when the debtor's attorney acts for the estate's benefit." 
This explanation is faulty, however, because in such a situation the 
debtor's attorney would be eligible for an award as a professional person 
hired under section 327 or 1103. 
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further support for the conclusion that debtors' attorneys, 
other than those mentioned within that subsection, are 
precluded from the award of compensation for fees and 
expenses based on the canon of statutory construction, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See Century Cleaning, 
195 F.3d at 1057 n.3. This argument, however, ignores the 
structure of S 330. 
 
If S 330(a)(4)(B) is read without reference to the entire text 
of S 330(a)(4), it could be read to provide a Chapter 12 or 
Chapter 13 debtor's attorney a right to an award not shared 
by that attorney's peers. However, when S 330(a)(4)(A) is 
read in conjunction with the proceeding subsection, 
S 330(a)(4)(B), it is clear that this was not Congress's intent. 
Section 330(a)(4)(A) seeks to assure that only services that 
are unique, necessary or reasonably likely to benefit the 
debtor's estate are compensated. Section 330(a)(4)(B) sets 
forth a more liberal standard for attorneys representing 
individual debtors in a Chapter 12 or 13 bankruptcy 
proceeding. "The fact that the statute employs a different 
standard to determine the level of reimbursement for 
Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 debtor's attorneys certainly does 
not suggest that the other debtor's attorneys are not 
entitled to reimbursement." Century Cleaning , 195 F.3d at 
1057 n.3. Indeed, recognition by Congress that this discrete 
class of debtors' attorneys need to be excepted from the 
regular, more stringent standards for compensation 
evidences Congress's belief that debtors' attorneys in 
general remained eligible for compensation under the 
customary standard. To then read S 330 to preclude 
eligibility would create a glaring inconsistency in the 
Bankruptcy Code.4 
 
In addition, S 329 contemplates the prepetition payment 
of fees to the debtor's attorney from the debtor, subject to 
court review for reasonableness. Payment by the debtor of 
a prepetition retainer would not remove those funds from 
the property of the estate. This being the case, would S 330 
prevent the prepetition retainer from being applied to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Moreover, Congress did not omit "debtor's attorney" from section 
330(a)(1) and replace it with "debtor's attorney authorized under section 
330(a)(4)(B)." The omission in 330(a)(1) was without qualification. 
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postpetition attorney services performed for the debtor? See 
Miller, 211 B.R. at 402. If it did, this would create another 
imponderable in the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Accordingly, because the statutory scheme would be 
rendered inconsistent if we were to read S 330(a) to omit 
debtors' attorneys and because the legislative history does 
not manifest an intent by Congress to change the long- 
standing practice of compensating debtors' attorneys,5 see 
Century Cleaning, 195 F.3d at 1058-60 (comprehensively 
detailing legislative history of the statute); see also 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-420 (1992) ("[T]his 
Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would 
interpret the Code, however vague the particular language 
under consideration might be, to effect a major change in 
pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some 
discussion in the legislative history."), we conclude that 
debtors' attorneys may still receive an award of 
compensation from the estate for services rendered and 
expenses incurred. 
 
III. DID HELLRING LINDEMAN RECEIVE DUE PROCESS? 
 
We now turn to the constitutional adequacy of the 
proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court. Hellring Lindeman 
alleges that the Bankruptcy Court did not provide it with 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard pursuant to 
the Due Process Clause when, during the fee application 
hearing, the Bankruptcy Court sua sponte raised doubts 
about awarding a fee to Hellring Lindeman. Hellring 
Lindeman argues that the timing of this notice did not 
afford it the time needed to prepare an answer to the 
Bankruptcy Court's position. For example, Hellring 
Lindeman cites the fact that David Wolff of Hellring 
Lindeman erroneously informed the Bankruptcy Court 
during the hearing that Hellring Lindeman had not 
submitted a reorganization plan. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Given the curious structure of the statute and the product of the 
debtor, we cannot help but be reminded of an admonition often 
attributed to Bismarck that "No man should see how laws or sausages 
are made." See Community Nutrition Institute, et al. v. Block, 749 F.2d 
50, 
51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.). 
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Our examination of the record does not, however, bear 
out the contention that Hellring Lindeman did not have an 
opportunity to present to the Bankruptcy Court the extent 
to which Hellring Lindeman's services benefitted the estate. 
At the hearing, the Bankruptcy Judge expressed her 
concerns that Hellring Lindeman's efforts had not 
benefitted the estate and questioned Wolff about this: 
 
       [O]ne of my concerns in the [Chapter] 11-- and I'm not 
       sure it was fully addressed -- is the bottom line, you 
       guys represented a debtor-out-of-possession. Why am I 
       compensating you at all for the estate if I can't discern 
       any benefit? And I don't mean to be cutting you off at 
       the knees but if my whole concern is benefit, so what 
       did you guys do for me so-to-speak 
 
JA at A-221. Wolff discussed the services rendered by 
Hellring Lindeman, including the mistaken representation 
that it had not submitted a reorganization plan, and 
concluded by saying, "But with that, I'm finished, Your 
Honor." JA at A-225. Hellring Lindeman did not attempt to 
correct the erroneous statement about the reorganization 
plan during the intervening 37-day period before the 
Bankruptcy Court issued its ruling; nor did Hellring 
Lindeman ask for the opportunity to expand upon the 
explanation of benefit given by Wolff at the fee hearing. 
 
We have previously noted that "the bankruptcy court has 
the power and the duty to review fee applications, 
notwithstanding the absence of objections by the United 
States trustee . . . creditors, or any other interested party 
. . . ." In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Centers, Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 
848 (3d Cir. 1994). See 11 U.S.C. S 330(a)(2) ("The 
[bankruptcy] court may, on its own motion . . . award 
compensation that is less than the amount of compensation 
that is requested."). We further noted that "the Code, see 
SS 329(b), 330(a); see also Rule 2017(b) -- and perhaps 
even the dictates of due process, see U.S. CONST., amend. 
V -- mandates that the court allow the fee applicant an 
opportunity, should it be requested, to present evidence or 
argument that the fee application meets the prerequisites 
for compensation; canons of fairness militate against 
forfeiture of the requested fees simply because the court's 
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audit of the application uncovers some ambiguity or 
objection." Busy Beaver, 19 F.3d at 846. 
 
In Busy Beaver, the Bankruptcy Court sua sponte, 
"issued an order denying compensation for certain services 
performed by paraprofessionals . . . ." Id.  at 838. The 
aggrieved attorney did not have an opportunity to argue on 
his behalf until he filed a motion for reconsideration. Here, 
when faced with the Bankruptcy Court's objection to its fee, 
Hellring Lindeman could have requested additional time to 
prepare an answer to the objections. It did not do so. Nor, 
did Hellring Lindeman request a further hearing. In Busy 
Beaver, we stressed that a hearing should be held when 
requested. Id. Although Hellring Lindeman had ample time 
to correct the record or request a follow-up hearing, it 
chose not to do so. Accordingly, Hellring Lindeman cannot 
now demonstrate that it was not afforded due process. 
 
IV. THE "REASONABLY LIKELY TO BENEFIT" TEST 
 
The Bankruptcy Court applied a "benefits analysis test" 
when evaluating Hellring Lindeman's fee application. See In 
re Xebec, 147 B.R. 518 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990). According to 
that test, the "attorney's services had to be identifiable, 
tangible, and of material benefit to the estate in order to be 
compensable." (Dec. 3, 1998 Tr. at 23). On appeal to the 
District Court, Hellring Lindeman directed the Court to 
S 330(a)(4)(A) which prohibits compensation for the 
"unnecessary duplication of services; or . . . services that 
were not- . . . reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's 
estate; or . . . necessary to the administration of the case." 
11 U.S.C. S 330(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). 
 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's 
determination that a debtor's attorney seeking allowances 
for services provided after appointment of a Chapter 11 
Trustee must show an actual benefit to the estate"lest the 
state be taxed twice for services that only the Trustee 
should have rendered." We do not agree. Section 
330(a)(4)(A) already protects the estate from the 
unnecessary duplication of services. We will, therefore, 
adopt the test proposed by Hellring Lindeman that its 
application be evaluated pursuant to the standards set 
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forth in S 330(a)(4)(A) and not by some heightened standard 
or by hindsight. Accordingly, the debtor's attorney must 
show that the representation was reasonably likely to 
benefit the debtor's estate. 
 
Do Hellring Lindeman's services for the debtors during 
the attempted reorganization meet the "reasonably likely to 
benefit the debtor's estate" standard set forth in 
S 330(a)(4)(A)? The Bankruptcy Court held that it "could 
find no service that was not either A) . . . rendered solely to 
the debtor out of possession and thereby by definition of no 
benefit to the estate or B) . . . that was not duplicative of 
a Trustee or Trustee's counsel duty. Therefore, I disallow 
any fees to Hellring [Lindeman] in the Chapter 11 context." 
JA at A-23. The District Court concurred but noted further 
that even if the "reasonableness" test adopted were applied, 
Hellring Lindeman still would not be eligible for an award 
of fees and expenses from the estate. Our review of the 
record convinces us that Hellring Lindeman's services do 
not meet the "reasonableness" test. 
 
It is primarily the duty of the Chapter 11 Trustee to help 
the parties reach an acceptable reorganization plan. The 
debtor's attorneys must bring something unique to the 
negotiations in order to receive compensation from the 
estate. Hellring Lindeman's fee application states, inter alia, 
that its services to the debtors included: (1) meeting with 
the debtor's principals to learn the history of the cases, (2) 
reviewing the exhaustive pleadings of the case, (3) meeting 
with the debtor's prior counsel to learn about the complex 
background of the case, (4) preparing numerous pleadings, 
(5) attending various court hearings, (6) conducting 
numerous telephone conversations and meetings with 
representatives of the debtors concerning diverse matters, 
and (7) researching various legal issues. After a search of 
the record, we are unable to ascertain any particular action 
by the debtor's attorney that could not have been done by 
the Trustee and his staff. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court 
found that it was the debtors who were inflexible and 
insistent that Walder Sondak not be fairly compensated. 
Given that finding, which is not clearly erroneous, along 
with the nature of the services performed, it is difficult to 
see how Hellring Lindeman's services could have been 
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considered reasonably likely to benefit the estate. Cf. In re 
Pro-Snax, 157 F.3d at 426 n.17 (commenting that even 
under a reasonableness test the law firm should have 
concluded that its services would be futile). 
 
Hellring Lindeman also argues that the mere fact that it 
was appointed by the Bankruptcy Court demonstrates that 
its representation was reasonably likely to benefit the 
estate. No such per se rule exists. It is the burden of the 
debtor's attorneys to demonstrate that their representation 
was reasonably likely to benefit the estate. Hellring 
Lindeman did not do so. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we conclude that debtor's attorneys are eligible 
for compensation from the estate when their services meet 
the standards set forth in 11 U.S.C. S 330(a)(4)(A). We find, 
however, that Hellring Lindeman's services do not rise to 
meet that standard. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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